The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s and Israeli threats shaped Iranian military capabilities, including advancements in missile technology, asymmetric warfare, and integration of foreign military insights into strategies for deterrence
Mohammed Mossadegh (1880-1967), Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister in the 1950s, captured the imagination by promising to nationalize oil and invest its profits in the welfare of the Iranians. Mossadegh kept the pledge by ending the London-based Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company’s almost five-decade monopoly over Iran’s petroleum extraction, marketing, and sales.
Britain retaliated to Mossadegh’s move by imposing economic sanctions, a naval embargo, withdrawing British technicians, and blocking exports to cripple Iran’s lifeline industry. Behind the scenes, it planned to overthrow Mosaddegh before the plot was uncovered and led to the closure of the British embassy in Tehran and the deportation of undercover agents plotting a coup posing as diplomats.
The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stepped in to launch a more foolproof Operation Ajax to overthrow Mossadegh in three weeks by buying off the Iranian press, members of the clergy, and rogue military elements, paving the way for a 50–50 split of oil revenues with an international consortium controlling its marketing and production. Mossadegh was banished in August 1953 to his native village, where he spent the rest of his life under house arrest.
Making Of The Revolution
British and American intelligence agents executed Operation Ajax from Tehran’s American embassy and installed the Shah’s brutal rule. Mossadegh’s removal was among the reasons that prepared the ground for the 1979 revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini. The 444-day embassy seizure and captivity of American diplomats that followed the revolution was part of an attempt to prevent the 1953-style coup. The US responded by sanctioning Tehran and backing Iraqi ruler Saddam’s eight-year invasion of Iran to counter the revolution.
Iran was forced to agree to a UN-brokered ceasefire to end the war in September 1988 after Iraq resorted to chemical weapons and Americans brought down an Iranian civilian aircraft, signalling an open siding with Saddam. The 20th century’s longest war (1980–88), which left an estimated million dead, and the Israeli threat have since shaped Iran’s approach to warfare and three-pronged doctrinal focus on proxy warfare, asymmetric warfare, and ballistic missiles.
No Pushover
Iran has, since the 1979 revolution, supported Palestinians against Israel and backed an ‘axis of resistance’ involving groups such as Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Houthis (Yemen), and Hamas (Palestine). On 1 April 2024, Israel bombed Iran’s consulate in Damascus and killed two Iranian generals, prompting Tehran to hit back 12 days later with its first direct attack on Israeli territory. The attack amid Israel’s genocidal campaign against Palestinians in Gaza ended years of shadow war involving attacks using proxies and assassinations.
The Israeli assassinations of Hamas’s political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut forced Iran to launch its second and larger direct attack on Israel on October 1, 2024. Israel responded three weeks later amid inflammatory rhetoric about targeting Iran’s nuclear and energy facilities and assassinating Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Israel restricted the attack to military bases and avoided civilian casualties, underscoring Iranian military capabilities as a regional power and no pushover.
The 1991 war in the aftermath of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq underscored the need for Iran to deter, defend, and undermine the overwhelming military strength of its adversaries, such as the US and Israel. Matthew McInnis, a former US State Department policy planning staff, wrote in an American Enterprise Institute paper that asymmetric warfare concepts have been at the center of Iran’s offensive and deterrence doctrine.
Psychological Backdrop
The psychological effects of Iraq’s use of missiles on Iran’s urban areas in the 1980s prompted the maintenance of a missile programme as the centerpiece of Iranian military capabilities and broader military doctrine. McInnis wrote that the most significant of Iranian doctrines is passive defense, developed after the 1991 war to prevent US aircraft and missiles from identifying and destroying critical Iranian targets.
The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq prompted Iran to develop capabilities to withstand foreign interventions and, failing that, mobilize a large, dispersed guerrilla force to retake lost territory. McInnis noted that American strategists often refer to this as ‘anti-access/area denial’, under which the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has focused on extending the range of its missiles and submarines aimed at US maritime operations in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea.
Pragmatic Solutions
McInnis cited evidence from publicly available Iranian material, statements of Iranian leaders, and major military exercises, and concluded that they suggest Iranian military doctrine does not generally descend from Islamic teachings and revolutionary ideology per se. He wrote the doctrine instead appears to draw mostly on military lessons learned to find effective, pragmatic solutions to security challenges within the framework of the ideological and strategic objectives.
McInnis argued that ideology at a minimum shapes the organizational structure and mission of the IRGC, especially its unconventional warfare and military intelligence wing, the Quds Force. He wrote that other exceptions may include concepts such as martyrdom, and these factors have likely influenced the IRGC’s approach to proxy guerrilla warfare, etc, as well as internal defense strategies.
The Iranian Army, or the Artesh, imbibed training and doctrine from the US and other Western powers over decades. Artesh was being purged and relegated under the newly formed IRGC when Saddam invaded Iran. McInnis wrote that Iranian military doctrine explicitly incorporates foreign military thinking and capabilities, especially those of the US, but the process requires ex post facto ideological and Islamic moral justification from the supreme leader. He added that there is little restriction on employing effective foreign military technologies in war-fighting concepts in line with the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties’ tradition of sanctioning the adoption and subsequent ‘Iranianization’ of anything proven to be effective in war.
McInnis wrote that the Iranian armed forces appear hesitant to go beyond defense, deterrence, and asymmetric warfare in most circumstances. He added that Islamic teachings on retaliation limit the Iranian leadership’s willingness to employ force in a manner that it considers to be disproportionate, at least in its use of missiles and other conventional power, as well as cyber capabilities. McInnis wrote that the Iranian military, which is restricted from accessing weapons and technology, is arguably the product of rational choices by the leadership in Tehran, given Iran’s limited resources and ideological commitment to opposing the US.
In November 2023, Iranian military capabilities and its expansive weapons were showcased when Khamenei was presented with rocket-powered ‘cruise missiles’, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, improved variants of direct-attack precision-guided munitions, and previously unseen long-endurance uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) at the IRGC’s Aerospace Force Museum in Tehran.
Fabian Hinz and Douglas Barrie, fellows at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), wrote that Fattah 2 was perhaps the most ambitious of these capabilities showcased. They noted the Fattah 2, a winged missile believed to be capable of hypersonic speeds, dovetails with Tehran’s long-standing ambition to acquire higher-speed cruise weapons to complement its subsonic land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). They wrote that Iran is also believed to be building a wind tunnel capable of supporting high-speed aerodynamics research.
In 2022, Iran began shipping UAVs to Russia. Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu viewed missiles in Iran in September 2023, a month before the end of the UN’s missile-related restrictions on Iran. Russia signed a contract in late 2023 for the purchase of Iran’s Fath-360 and Ababil close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs). Fabian Hinz wrote that Fath-360 and Ababil systems, which are less well-known than their longer-range counterparts, illustrate Iran’s recent focus on developing short-range tactical missiles adapted from larger, existing weapon designs.
The Accuracy
Fath-360, also known under its export designation BM-120, is a scaled-down version of Iran’s Fateh class of precision-guided solid-propellant missiles and has a range of 120 kilometres. Fath-360 straddles the line between SRBMs and guided artillery rockets and can be launched from containerized multiple-launch platforms. The Ababil, which has a range of 86 km and carries a 45-kilogram warhead, was promoted for export at Russia’s Army 2024 exhibition. Fath-360 and Ababil systems are believed to have a high level of accuracy.
Iran’s short-range and low-altitude Azarakhsh (thunderbolt) is a radar-equipped infrared detection and electro-optic system to detect and intercept targets. Azarakhsh is among a range of surface-to-air missile defence systems, including indigenous Bavar-373. American think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates Iran has at least 12 types of medium-range and short-range ballistic missiles, including the Tondar 69, Khorramshahr, and Sejjil, which have ranges between 150km (93 miles) to 2,000km (1,243 miles).
Iran also has an advanced nuclear programme, facilities, and research centres. Khamenei’s fatwa in the early 2000s banned the production of nuclear weapons, saying it is forbidden in Islam. A month after Tehran launched the first direct attack on Israel, Iran in May 20024, said this could change if Iran’s existence is threatened, underscoring the threat of an escalatory spiral if Israel is not reined in.
